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Abstract 
The right to health started gaining acceptance since the foundation of the modern human rights 
movement at the end of the Second World War. It has been incorporated into many global and 
regional human rights instruments and national constitutions. Access to medicines (A2M) is the 
fundamental element of the right to health that is recognized in The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, 
the development in the international patent law can undermine A2M. 
In the pursuit of promoting effective protection of patents, members of World Trade Organization 
adopted the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The 
Agreement heightened patent protection worldwide1. Patent protection standards were drawn from 
US law2. State Members were obliged to extent patent protection on socially important inventions 
such as medicines3. The extended patent protection increased prices of drugs and created a threat 
to A2M. Nevertheless, the Agreement has measures to promote A2M. These are called TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
Compulsory license (CL) is one of the flexibilities under TRIPS4. CL is an authorization granted 
by a government to someone other than the patent owner to produce the drug without the patent 
owner’s consent. The flexibility is a complex mechanism that consists of many elements. The 
central component of the CL mechanism is the ground for granting a CL because this element 
triggers the issuance of a CL. In the international patent law, grounds for CL are defined vaguely. 
TRIPS does not expressly identify grounds for CL, but the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (The Paris Convention) recognizes “failure to work” (F2W) as a ground for 
CL5. Many national laws have adopted the language of the Convention. For example, the Indian 
Patent Law incorporates F2W in the similar wording6. The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health (the Doha Declaration) reconfirms the Indian legislator’s choice by stating that 
the Member State has freedom to decide upon grounds upon which CLs are granted7. Despite being 
well established at the national level, F2W might be inconsistent with TRIPS8 because the original 
                                                 
1 Osenga (2012) p. 316 
2 Turrill (2013) p. 1557 
3 TRIPS, Art.27(1) 
4 TRIPS, Art.31 
5 The Paris Convention, Art.5(A)(2) 
6 The Indian Patents Act, Sec.84(1)(c) 
7 The Doha Declaration, Art.5(b) 
8 TRIPS, Art.27(1) 
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content of F2W demands local manufacturing of the patented invention. Issuing CL on the ground 
of F2W to promote A2M can reform the content of F2W, but it poses some conceptual difficulties.  
CL has the goal to promote public interest in A2M. However, A2M is a category of human rights 
law and it does not originally belong to patent law. CL cannot be properly informed by such a 
category. In contrast, F2W is the endemic category to patent law and can trigger the granting of 
CL. A2M can reform the content of F2W, but conceptual difficulties arise due to differences 
between human rights law discourse and patent law discourse.  
Legitimacy and conceptual appropriateness of F2W are not self-evident. Therefore, F2W content 
and its relevant provisions should be analyzed. Such concerns are sound because CL is a significant 
TRIPS mechanism that promotes A2M by limiting patent rights. Breaking patents can reduce 
pharmaceutical companies’ initiative to develop new medicines and undermine A2M in the long-
term perspective. Reviewing the Bayer Nexavar case, this paper attempts to establish legal and 
conceptual appropriateness of F2W and to determine if the ground can help to promote public 
interest in accessing medicines. 
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Abbreviations 
F2W Failure to work 
A2M Access to medicines 
CL Compulsory license 
R&D Research and development 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
PAP Patient Assistance Programs 
TRIPS The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus infection and 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the document that 
involves patent law and human rights. The Agreement sets forth patent law minimums for all 
Member States9 and is considered a pro-patent Agreement10. Proponents of TRIPS claim that 
heightened patent protection promotes incentives to research new medicines. Opponents argue that 
extensive patentability increases prices on drugs. Working within the frame of TRIPS, states strive 
to fulfill their human rights obligations. 
Before TRIPS, not all states provided patent protection to pharmaceuticals11. States concerned 
about access to medicines (A2M) could not provide patents for medicines, thereby avoiding the 
potentially high prices that might come with patents. Article 27(1) of TRIPS limited exclusions 
that countries can no longer promote access by denying patentability of drugs. Although TRIPS 
reinforces patent protection, it also includes some flexibilities, such as compulsory license (CL) to 
ease the conflict between patent rights and A2M. 
CL is a license issued by the State authorizing a third party to perform acts covered by the patents 
against the will of the patent owner12. After TRIPS was adopted, around 100 countries had 
implemented CL under national law13. CL is effective in situations when a patent owner maintains 
artificially high prices on patented drugs. TRIPS does not limit CL grounds. The Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Doha Declaration) proclaims that each member may 
freely determine the grounds upon which CL may be granted.  
Delineating grounds for CL, policy makers face a dilemma. A broad formulation of CL grounds 
can result in the mechanism being employed frequently. Patients benefit from the frequent CL use 
because it brings affordable generics to the market. Nevertheless, the frequent use can undermine 
branded pharmaceutical companies’ initiative to discover new drugs because CL can deprive them 
of monopoly profits. Defining CL grounds, a government seeks a compromise. Patent law provides 
guidance in delineating CL grounds. 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the Paris Convention) recognizes 
F2W as a legitimate CL ground14, and national laws endorse the Convention in this regard15, but 
                                                 
9 Martins (2014) p. 389 
10 Ho (2007) p. 1470 
11 Crook (2005) p. 531 
12 Kuanpoth (2015) p. 63 
13 Lybecker (2009) p. 222 
14 Wang (2014) p. 102 
15 Correa (2015) p. 45 
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the Convention does not define F2W content. It should be noticed that in national patent laws and 
legal literature F2W is also referred as “working requirement”. Both terms will be equally used 
further in the paper. In the past, national laws linked F2W with local manufacturing of the patented 
product. Later, the states allowed to exploit patents merely through import. The Convention 
endorsed import at the international level. Even more, TRIPS conveys the most-favored-nation 
principle and the national treatment principle, two overarching doctrines of WTO16, in the field of 
patent law17. Although F2W is acknowledged as a CL ground in the Convention and in national 
laws, its TRIPS-compliance should be questioned. An F2W legal assessment depends on its 
content, which in turn is problematic. 
TRIPS prescribes that the term must be interpreted in a manner to protect public health. The Doha 
Declaration specifies TRIPS by putting an emphasize on A2M. As a result, patent law refers to the 
human rights category. A2M is stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Thus, F2W 
content should be defined in the context of A2M. However, the correlation between F2W and A2M 
is complicated.  
F2W and A2M belong to different discourses. There are crucial differences between patent law 
and human rights law such as private versus public character and territorial versus universal nature, 
to name a few. The framing of patents as being opposed to human rights leaves behind a legacy of 
acceptance that patents are and should not be expected to contribute anything other than private 
interests18. Three dominant conceptions, such as subjugation, integration and coexistence, describe 
the interface of patents and human rights. Analyzing the convergence of F2W and A2M under 
different conceptions can reveal if F2W is conceptually appropriate. 
CL is the mechanism that can promote A2M at the cost of the initiative to research. F2W is the 
central element of the flexibility because it invokes the granting of CL. F2W has a great influence 
on the system’s ability to promote A2M. Nevertheless, its influence is limited because external 
factors also affect CL. For example, the US Special 301 Trade Report 2015 called upon countries 
to eliminate F2W. Such political pressure leads to an over-compliance of TRIPS. Evaluating the 
ability of CL to promote A2M would require considering a myriad of external factors. Despite its 
limitations, F2W to a large extent determines the ability of CL to promote access. Therefore, 
revealing the legal and conceptual appropriateness of F2W will allow assessing the ability of F2W 
to promote access to medicines. 
                                                 
16 Trebilcock (2005) p. 28 
17 Beier (1996) p. 189 
18 Gold (2013) pp. 186-187 
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1.2 Research questions 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of using F2W to 
promote access to medicines. In order to attain this goal I need to answer the research question of 
whether the interpretation of F2W that was given in the Bayer Nexavar case is sustainable. In turn, 
to determine sustainability of this term, I need to answer two sub-questions. Firstly, whether F2W 
is allowed under TRIPS, whether its interpretation in the Bayer Nexavar case is in line with the 
Agreement. This sub-question is important for several reasons. F2W has a legacy as a tool of 
protectionism, but protectionism is banned by TRIPS. Even more, in the initial trial and at the 
appeal stage of the Bayer Nexavar case, F2W was provided with different interpretations. Such an 
inconsistent interpretation, even within one case, illustrates the problematic character of F2W. 
Secondly, I want to inquire if F2W is conceptually appropriate. This sub-question is crucial 
because originally F2W was not meant to facilitate access to medicines. Prima facie, F2W in the 
context of access to medicines seems misplaced. 
 
1.3 Justifications for the research 
The public interest in accessing medicines is an important human rights issue. A number of 
international statements and declarations over the last decade has addressed the global lack of such 
access19. However, the development that stems from TRIPS, such as the heightened patent 
protection of pharmaceuticals, exacerbates the issue. The elevated patent protection makes many 
medicines, currently available on the market, too expensive for millions of people around the 
world. Many drugs available in the developing world are only available to a small percentage of 
the population due to economic inequalities20. While this might be an acceptable outcome for 
certain commodities, such as luxury goods, it is unacceptable for life-saving medicines. In an 
attempt to limit the adverse impact of patent rights on public interest, TRIPS provided for CL. 
F2W serves as a justification for CL, but F2W is a controversial legal category. As an element of 
CL, F2W is important for promoting access to drugs in the TRIPS context. It is therefore 
worthwhile to inquire the legal and conceptual appropriateness of F2W as a ground for CL. 
As far as the selection is concerned, it should be stated that India supplies 20% of the global market 
for generic medicines21. The country is the major supplier to emerging markets and has become 
                                                 
19 Grover (2012) p. 236 
20 Ibid 
21 Waning (2010) 
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the biggest supplier to UN health care programs22. In particular, to countries like South Africa and 
Botswana, India helped to facilitate the global scale-up of HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals23. The 
generics industry has earned India the nickname of “pharmacy of the developing world” because 
of the volume of generic medicines it exports each year24. Not only developing countries in Africa 
and other regions, but also India itself, have benefitted from Indian generics. Generics dominate 
the Indian pharmaceutical market and account for around 75 percent of the market by volume25. 
Nevertheless, patent rights can threaten the Indian generics industry. F2W justifying CL could 
protect the industry from excessive patent protection. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
Initially, I will use doctrinal analysis with its conventional dogmatic interpretation approach to 
establish the meaning and scope of relevant law provisions. Later, I will examine theoretical 
findings, which I will obtain through the doctrinal method, against the empirical administration of 
law in the Bayer Nexavar case. Next, I will make use of qualitative analysis to embrace broad and 
dynamic social-economic categories that exist in the world outside the law, such as public interest, 
patent social costs, etc. Qualitative analysis is difficult to perform because social-economic 
categories are even more “slippery” than legal ones26. A researcher is more exposed to bias in 
qualitative analysis than in others. Dobinson argues that doctrinal analysis is a particular form of 
qualitative analysis27. Qualitative analysis will require me to perform the process of selecting and 
weighing factual materials, taking into account their relevant social context. Doctrinal analysis is 
a quest for meanings in the relatively static environment of legal sources. In contrast, qualitative 
analysis occurs in the fast-changing environment with myriads of social context elements that may 
also include legal sources. Finally, I will employ quantitative analysis to obtain measures of 
relevant categories, such as the amount of times CLs were granted since the TRIPS Agreement 
was adapted; the amount of patentable medicines on the WHO “Model List of Essential 
Medicines” that feasibly can become a target of CL, etc. Quantitative analysis is considered more 
reliable because of the reduced intervention on the researcher’s side. This type of analysis is 
allocated on the empirical edge of the methodological continuum and is mostly employed in 
natural sciences. Taking into account the nature of the subject, features of the research question 
                                                 
22 Dhawan (2015) 
23 Lewis (2014) p. 1062 
24 Turril (2013) p. 1558 
25 Dhawan (2015) 
26 Ezzy (2002) p. 5 
27 Dobinson (2007) p. 22 
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and the methods employed, I will perform the legal empirical research of the evaluative nature 
with a descriptive component. 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
Thesis comprises of three main parts. Following the introduction, the second chapter gives a brief 
overview of CL. The chapter aims to review different elements of the CL system. Firstly, grounds 
for CL are considered. F2W is compared to other grounds to define its normative weight. More, 
the scope and the duration of CL are discussed to determine how F2W influences these elements. 
Then, the interface between F2W and the remuneration for the patent CL are reviewed. Further, 
exclusions and exceptions under TRIPS are reviewed. The review describes the shift in patent 
regulation and its implications for F2W. Next, the chapter proceeds to consider relations between 
F2W and the interests that are balanced by CL. 
The third chapter aims to explore the conceptual convergence of F2W and A2M. It examines the 
correlation under three major conceptions. Then, the chapter continues to review different 
international and national laws searching for A2M content because it has a significant descriptive 
value for F2W. The discussion in this chapter will be used in the last chapter to assess the ability 
of F2W to strike a balance between patent rights and the public interest in accessing medicines. 
The last chapter briefly introduces the history that predates the litigation. Then, it moves to analyze 
the decision rendered by the Controller of Patent in Mumbai (the Controller) and the judgment 
delivered by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board in Chennai (The Board). The chapter 
culminates with the test of theoretical findings on F2W against its authoritative interpretation in 
the Bayer Nexavar case. 
Lastly, thesis sums up the major points of discussion and concludes with few foresight notes on 
the future of F2W as a ground for CL. 
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2 Chapter Two: Compulsory License Overview: Focus on “Failure to Work” 
2.1 The Operation of the Compulsory License Regime 
CL is an authorization that is granted by the government without the permission of the patent 
owner28. The fact that CL operates with the previously granted patent suggests that the subject 
matter must be patentable29. As a result, CL is an exception to patent infringement rather than an 
exclusion from patentability. Most countries have provisions for CL, either under their patent law 
like India or through anti-trust legislation like the US. Under TRIPS30, countries have the right to 
issue such licenses to promote competition and increase the affordability of patented inventions31 
and to remedy abuses of unexploited patents to clog the register32. Even more, in light of the 
important role that CL could play in contemporary patent law, WTO reaffirms its members’ right 
to grant such licenses in the Doha Declaration. One of the main themes in the Declaration is that 
patent protection should be implemented in a manner that permits WTO members to protect public 
health and promote A2M33. The Paris Convention provides countries with the right to take 
legislative measures for the grant of CL to prevent abuses of patent rights34. Neither the Agreement 
nor the Convention limit the grounds or reasons for granting CL; countries can only use the 
grounds that are allowed by their national legislation. However, the Paris Convention mentions 
F2W as an example. Many states incorporated this example in their legislations35. The Agreement 
states that the conditions under which a compulsory license is granted should be regulated in 
accordance with TRIPS36. Therefore, the development of an appropriate national legislation is 
crucial. 
Following the guidance of the Doha Declaration, WTO members have adopted the relevant CL 
legislation and made use of the CL scheme to meet the demands of public health. For instance, in 
recent years Brazil, India, Taiwan, and Thailand have issued CLs on pharmaceuticals that treat 
deadly diseases. The practice of CL varies from country to country. For example, in Brazil CL is 
occasionally used by the government as a tool to threaten drug companies to reduce prices. Asian 
countries have granted CLs that have led to considerable international controversy among local 
governments, patent owners, and their home countries. Most of these CLs concern citizens’ A2M, 
pharmaceutical companies’ incentive to invest in research and development (R&D) for new drugs, 
                                                 
28 Timmermans (2000) 
29 Frankel and Lai (2015) p. 153 
30 TRIPS, Art.31 
31 Correa (2000) p. 93 
32 Blakeney (1996) para. 8.19 
33 Wang (2015) p. 192 
34 The Paris Convention, Art.5(A)(2) 
35 The Patent Act 1977 (UK), Sec.48A(1)(a); The Patent Act 2013 (NZ), Sec.164(2)  
36 TRIPS, Art.31 
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and the correct interpretation of relevant international treaties. For the reason that practice of CL 
significantly affects patent owners’ profits from the domestic market and control over their 
inventions, most of them are against such practices37. On the other hand, increasing drug prices 
have troubled governments in developing countries where lack of access to affordable medicines 
imperils the health of their citizens. Although many countries made use of CL, relative to the large 
number of patents now in effect in WTO member states, the frequency and the numbers of CLs to 
date have still been low38. 
The infrequent use of CL is used as an argument against the CL system. While it is true that in 
some countries, e.g. the UK, few CLs have been issued, other countries, among them developed 
countries such as the US, have granted a large number of compulsory licenses39. However, 
regardless of whether or not CL is used frequently, provisions for CL are needed, because they 
will encourage the patent owner to behave correctly. They give a sign to the patent owner that in 
the case of abuse of rights or non-availability of the product, a third party could be allowed to use 
the invention. CL prevents malpractice and misuse of the monopoly rights. In fact, one of the most 
important aspects of the CL system is its impact on the actual behavior of the patent owner40. The 
system is therefore a necessary element of patent law. Nevertheless, to ensure that the system can 
be used effectively, it is important to carefully state the grounds and conditions for its use in 
national legislation. CLs should be used for reasons related to the public interest in accessing 
medicines. 
 
2.1.1 Recognized grounds 
In the context of F2W, the term “work” was initially aimed at local manufacture41, and it predates 
WTO and TRIPS. The Paris Convention provides the scope for CL at the domestic law level and 
it allows the national legislation to grant a CL if a patent is only exploited through import. In 
contrast, TRIPS prescribes that patent rights shall be enjoyable even if products are imported42. 
Therefore, under TRIPS, import can satisfy local working requirement43 or avoid F2W. Denying 
                                                 
37 Shen (2015)  p. 292 
38 Liu (2012) pp. 679, 681 
39 Timmermans (2000) 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid  
42 TRIPS, Art.27(1) 
43 Gervais (2012) p. 492 
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import as a fulfilment of F2W may violate the principle of technological neutrality expounded by 
TRIPS44. F2W relying on local manufacturing may contradict TRIPS. 
The interface between TRIPS and the Paris Convention in relation to F2W is ambiguous. Article 
2(2) of TRIPS incorporates the Paris Convention into TRIPS states: “[n]othing in Parts I to IV of 
this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other 
under the Paris Convention”45. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the patent working 
requirements of the Paris Convention and the CL provisions of TRIPS are grounds for CL. 
Nevertheless, this is not the full picture, and the way the Convention and TRIPS function together 
is relevant. TRIPS neither eliminates the Convention nor derogates from it, but the Convention 
equally cannot be used to defeat the safeguards that TRIPS requires for licenses. Therefore, the 
recognition under the Convention does not render F2W TRIPS compatible per se. The recognition 
of F2W at the national level should also be addressed. 
CL exists to ensure local working of patents or avoid F2W that public expectations can be met46. 
The Paris Convention provides that countries shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of CL to prevent, for example, F2W47. Countries have responded to the 
provision by adopting relevant laws. For instance, the UK Patent Act 1977 also contains terms 
such as “not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable”48. Even more, 
Australian patent law uses the phrase that “the reasonable requirements of the public with respect 
to the patented invention have not been satisfied”. The phrase implies that the invention is not 
being worked on a commercial scale in Australia when this is possible49. In addition, Indian patent 
law recognizes F2W in terms such as “the patented invention is not worked in the territory of 
India”. Despite the slightly different wording, it is evident that F2W has a wide recognition at the 
national level. 
As stated above, CL provisions of the Paris Convention are incorporated into TRIPS, but the 
incorporation of F2W is not straightforward. TRIPS implicitly provides, other than F2W, grounds 
for CL. The Agreement refers to grounds by explicating the conditions under which CL may take 
place. For instance, TRIPS recognizes such a ground as the patentee’s refusal to deal50. Hence, CL 
becomes a potential remedy to different anti-competitive practices, depending on the competition 
laws of member states. In addition, TRIPS refers to national emergency, government use, and cross 
                                                 
44 Bonadio (2012) pp.722-724 
45 TRIPS, Art.2(2) 
46 Cornish (2010) paras 7-40 and 21-22 
47 The Paris Convention, Art.5(A)(2) 
48 The Patent Act 1977 (UK), Sec.48A(1)(b), the section deals with CLs for patentees who are non-WTO proprietors 
49 Patent Act (AU), Sec.133(2)(a)(ii) 
50 TRIPS, Art.31(b) 
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licensing, to name a few. TRIPS reduces the international recognition of F2W by not mentioning 
it. Hence, the ground is somewhat neglected at the international level. Apart from statutory 
recognition, F2W has gained some acceptance by customary law. 
As mentioned above, TRIPS implicitly refers to some CL grounds, but these are not exhaustive51. 
Article 31 does not delineate any limits as to what can be a ground for CL52, and some CL grounds 
lack international norms. For example, there are no relevant norms about the CL that may be 
granted as a consequence of anti-competitive conduct. In contrast, international norms have 
formed around F2W due to the frequent national application of the ground. Reichman argues that 
Article 31 magnifies the legitimacy of every complying government’s right to resort to CL 
whenever its domestic self-interest so requires53. He claims that it offers a blank canvas for what 
can constitute a ground. In turn, Blakeney argues that member states seeking to implement CL 
may rely on Article 7 and 8 of TRIPS to glean CL grounds, other than those referred to in Article 
31. Therefore, theoretically, many CL grounds can be deduced many from the articles, but these 
grounds will lack the international norms that have formed around them. Thus, the ample 
application at the national level have provided F2W with a customary law status. The relation 
between F2W and other CL conditions should be discussed. 
CL can only be granted if the granting process considers applications on their individual merits. 
Different circumstances result in different modalities of CL. For instance, a CL issued on the F2W 
ground will be different from a CL that is issued on the ground of anti-competitive conduct. The 
ground that invokes the granting of CL determines other CL conditions. If a CL is invoked on an 
The F2W ground, it has certain consequences for such CL conditions as scope and duration, prior 
negotiation and remuneration. Hence, F2W is important for other CL conditions. 
2.2.2 Scope and duration 
The controversy over the appropriate scope of CL was one of the reasons that TRIPS negotiation 
were initiated54. At the early stage of negotiation, texts such as the Anell Draft and the Brussels 
Draft tended to limit the issuance of CL. The final text of the Agreement does not limit CL grounds, 
but it imposes some requirements that the state issuing a CL must fulfill. Governments avail 
themselves of the right to grant CL, but the granting procedure varies from country to country. For 
instance, while in Brazil the president is in charge to order a CL, in the US, the Federal Trade 
                                                 
51 Correa (2000) 
52 Van den Bossche (2008) pp.788-789 
53 Reichman (2010) p. 591 
54 Madieha (2013) p. 208 
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Commission, the US Department of Justice or private parties55 may bring actions in the courts to 
obtain a CL. In comparison, granting CL in India relies on administrative and judicial procedures. 
The possible scope and duration of CL should be analyzed in the context of the F2W ground 
because these elements are important for promoting A2M. Scope and duration imply the range of 
relief that can be granted in a CL56. Considering scope and duration of CL, Reichman argues that 
the “practical ramifications of Article 31 may ultimately depend on a combination of state practice 
at the local and regional levels and subsequent legislative or judicial action at the international 
level”57. In determining the scope of the reliefs granted by way of CL, governments consider 
different criteria that are provided by TRIPS. Article 31(c) of TRIPS states: “[t]he scope and 
duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized …”; therefore 
purpose is important for the scope and duration of CL. Choosing a purpose, governments exercise 
a great discretion in determining the form of relief to be granted, as well as its lifespan. The basic 
purpose behind the issuance of a CL should be the overriding interest. The scope of CL should be 
considered together with the duration because they are coterminous with each other and because 
both of them rely on the relevant public interest58. 
Supposedly, the relevant purpose that is described in Article 31(c) TRIPS is related to the public 
interest for the issuance of the CL mentioned in Articles 7, 8 TRIPS and Paragraph 4 of the Doha 
Declaration. For example, in the context of the public interest in A2M, the scope of the CL should 
be limited to medicines that are necessary to address the health needs. The CL cannot be issued 
for “medicines” in general or as an entire class, but it must be limited to specific technology59. A 
government can authorize the CL of a specific drug, but not all anti-retroviral therapy60. The 
relevant base of patients should limit the scale of drug production. In order to accommodate public 
health needs, CL must enable either the production or the import of drugs. In determining the terms 
of a CL for the purposes of public health, the issuing authorities must take into account interests 
of the licensee and patent owner. The scope of the CL must take into account several things, such 
as the nature of the invention, the ability of the compulsory licensee to work the invention to the 
public advantage, and the risks that the compulsory licensee has to undertake providing capital and 
working the invention. Like voluntary licenses, CLs can be limited to persons, time, place, 
manufacture, use, or sale. It might be necessary to impose restrictions with regard to the field of 
                                                 
55 Reichman and Hasenzahl (2003) p. 10 
56 Madieha (2013) p. 209 
57 Ibid, p.16 
58 Madieha (2013) p. 210 
59 Osenga (2012) p. 318  
60 Ibid 
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application, the territory, or the amount of production61. For instance, if a CL was invoked on The 
F2W ground, the notion ‘working’ implies that the invention is being put into use or manufactured 
in the country. F2W obliges the compulsory licensee to manufacture the product in the country 
where the patent was issued rather than import the patented good. 
Invoking a CL on The F2W ground, a government may seek to remedy the non-availability of 
medicines62. Therefore, the licensing terms must ensure that the drugs produced under the CL 
reach the target audience; namely, medicines must be affordable to ordinary people and available 
gratis to certain groups. In some cases, if local production is not commercially feasible, CL may 
involve import of drugs from overseas by the compulsory licensee. Countries such as Malaysia, 
Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Rwanda, and Thailand have issued CLs for the purpose of import of 
generic drugs from other countries. Cheaply imported drugs offer an easy solution to non-
availability of patented drugs at affordable prices. Nevertheless, in absence of a local generic 
industry, invoking a CL on the F2W ground can hardly facilitate the public interest in A2M. The 
lifespan of the CL must also correspond to the nature of public interest. The time depends on the 
nature of the invention and the urgency of the problem. For example, a complex technology such 
as medicines would require a long working-out period. Due to their complexity, it is normal for 
medicine CLs to endure for the remaining duration of the patent term. In addition, other factors 
determine the duration of a CL. The redress needed to remedy life-threatening epidemics must be 
of a sufficiently long period to contain the spread of the disease. A number of CLs for 
communicable and non-communicable diseases have endured for the remaining period of the 
patent term63. For instance, Indonesia granted long-term CLs of retroviral drugs in 2005. However, 
in some cases, despite the urgency of health problems, governments issue CLs with a rather short 
lifespan. Thailand issued CLs for retroviral drugs in 2006 and 2007 for a short period, but these 
were renewed in 201064. 
Setting the timeframe of a CL, the compulsory licensee should not be deprived obtaining a 
reasonable compensation and an adequate return on R&D because otherwise, he or she will have 
no incentive to apply for a CL. This may require extending the scope and duration of a CL beyond 
what would actually be necessary in the light of the relevant public interest. Such an approach is 
confirmed by the fact that Article 31(g) TRIPS does not demand the termination of a CL on the 
sole ground that the circumstances, which led to the granting of a CL, have ceased to exist65. 
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Considering F2W in the context of CL duration, it should be noticed that F2W implies no 
restrictions on the duration of a CL and that a CL may have a long or short lifespan. 
Interpreting Article 31(c) TRIPS, one has to be mindful of the purpose for which CL has been 
issued. National experiences show the latitude of discretion possessed by authorities in issuing CL. 
Reichman argues that there is an expansive concept of public interest that will shape the discourse 
on CL66. The notion of CL must take into account all the noble aspirations contained in the 
preamble of TRIPS, particularly Articles 7 and 8. According to Reichman, “all these provisions 
arm developing and least-developed countries with legal grounds for maintaining a considerable 
degree of domestic control over intellectual property policies in a post-TRIPS environment, 
including compulsory licenses”67. CLs must be carefully crafted to reach the specific purpose for 
which they are issued, such as promoting A2M. 
 
2.1.3 Prior Negotiation 
Article 31(b) TRIPS states, “the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the 
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been 
successful within a reasonable period of time …” and therefore a CL applicant is obliged to 
conduct a prior negotiation before seeking a CL. The wording of Article 31(b) has provoked 
discussions about the nature of prior negotiation; sometimes it may become an obstacle for issuing 
a CL. For example, in Thailand, the patent owner of the AIDS drug “efavirenz” argued that the 
CL violated TRIPS because the Thai government did not engage in prior negotiation before issuing 
the CL68. Article 31(b) of TRIPS demands that a CL applicant must first undertake negotiation 
with the patent owner. Considering the nature of prior negotiation, it should be noticed that 
developed countries insisted on the condition because it would safeguard patent rights from being 
abrogated unjustifiably, but the nature of prior negotiation is not evident from TRIPS. It is not 
obvious if prior negotiation is a substantive CL ground or a procedure that a CL applicant must 
fulfill before he or she may be granted a CL. The “ground theory” treats prior negotiation as a 
substantive CL ground and relies on the document issued by the International Bureau of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) that states that “failure to obtain a voluntary license 
under reasonable terms within a reasonable period” is listed as one of the six most widely adopted 
grounds for a CL in developing countries69. 
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The “ground theory” implies that the refusal to license on reasonable commercial terms would 
constitute an abusive use of patent rights and therefore would trigger the CL. Consequently, 
according to theory, if a qualified person tries to obtain a voluntary license on reasonable 
commercial terms, but the patentee does not grant his or her consent within a reasonable period, it 
would constitute an independent ground for a CL. Hence, if the “ground theory” is the proper 
interpretation of TRIPS provisions then prior negotiation is an independent CL ground. In contrast, 
the proponents of the “procedure theory” claim that prior negotiation under TRIPS is merely a 
procedure. Therefore, the patent owner enjoys the right to refuse a voluntary license even if a CL 
applicant has offered reasonable commercial terms, while the CL applicant must make efforts to 
negotiate a voluntary license before he or she can file a CL application70. It is not clear what 
interpretation of prior negotiation is appropriate, but TRIPS negotiating history may shed some 
light on this point. 
Initially, Japan suggested the prior negotiation clause as a procedural safeguard for patent owners, 
and Switzerland supported Japan by proposing a similar provision that elevated the procedural 
dimension of prior negotiation. It appears that historically the clause was envisaged as a condition 
rather than an independent ground. The literal reading of the provision implies that prior 
negotiation requires the CL applicant to make efforts to obtain a voluntary license before filing a 
CL application, but scholars argue that the word “negotiation” is somewhat misleading. TRIPS 
does not require the CL applicant and the patent owner to actually talk and discuss with each other 
to reach an agreement71. The provision requires the applicant to make efforts to seek a voluntary 
license in good faith, but TRIPS does not set qualitative and quantitative criteria for them, although 
the plural form - “efforts” - is used here. Considering the negotiating history of TRIPS, and the 
Japanese position in particular, it appears that continued efforts of the CL applicant are not required 
and that a single attempt would fulfill the requirement. It appears that prior negotiation has a 
procedural character and therefore is subjugated to the ground on which a CL has been invoked.  
Some grounds, such as national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency that are stipulated 
in Article 31(b) TRIPS, may eliminate prior negotiation and a mere notification of the patent owner 
will be sufficient. In comparison, a CL that has been invoked on The F2W ground indispensably 
entails prior negotiation. The finding on the obligatory character of prior negotiation in case of 
F2W will be used in the last chapter to consider the ability of F2W to promote A2M. 
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2.1.4 Remuneration 
Remuneration is a condition of CL because it represents the well-established principle that a patent 
owner should be rewarded. John Stuart Mill wrote: “[T]he inventor ought to be both compensated 
and rewarded … will not be denied … it would be a gross immorality of the law to set everybody 
free to use a person’s work without his consent, and without giving him an equivalent”72. Even 
before TRIPS, almost all national patent laws besides the US law required the CL licensee to pay 
adequate remuneration to the patent owner. Hence, the US did not require the payment of 
remuneration if a CL was granted as a remedy against anti-competitive conduct73. Preceding 
TRIPS at the international level, the Paris Convention did not require the payment of remuneration 
for CL, but Article 31(h) TRIPS changed it by stating that “the right holder shall be paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization”. The agreement does not define “adequate remuneration”, but only provides “paid 
adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value 
of the authorization”. The vague wording of the article has provoked discussion among 
commentators. 
Välimäki argues that adequate CL remuneration should be considered differently in different 
situations. For example, if a CL strives to promote A2M, the objective will be to lower the price 
on drugs. Pursuing the objective, remuneration should be lower than reward under a voluntary 
license, but it should not be so low as to prevent parallel trade and decrease incentive to innovate. 
In contrast, if a CL aims to remedy an anti-competitive practice, remuneration should be lower 
than the regular level, or the patent owner should be denied any reward to reflect the punitive 
character of the CL, and therefore the adequate remuneration in such a case can be zero74. National 
experiences indicate that governments invoking CLs to safeguard the same public interest such as 
public health set different remunerations. For example, invoking CLs on the ground of public non-
commercial use for purposes of public health service, the Thai government imposed on the CL 
licensee a 0,5% royalty75. In comparison, invoking the CL on the F2W ground for the purpose of 
safeguarding public health, the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board set the royalty at 
7%76. Therefore, different CL grounds result in different royalty rates. This observation will be 
used in the last chapter to elaborate on the capacity of F2W to promote A2M. 
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2.2 Compulsory License among other patent limitations 
Patent law includes two kinds of limitations for patent rights. The first type of limitations implies 
exclusion, and therefore abstract theories, discoveries, and methods of treatment are excluded from 
patent protection. In turn, the second kind of limitations involves exceptions, also referred to as 
“exceptions”, “defences”, and “permitted acts”, to name a few77, that excuse from liability uses 
that would otherwise violate the patentee’s rights. Exceptions include situations when a person is 
able to use a patent on payment of a royalty; such exceptions are usually referred to as CLs.  
Justification for the same exclusions or exceptions varies in different countries. The Canadian 
Supreme Court excluded animals from patentability on the basis that they did not fall within the 
definition of invention78, while in Europe, animals are excluded because of public policy79. 
Bringing another example in this regard, the US Supreme Court stated that natural phenomena, 
mental processes, and abstract intellectual conceptions were excluded from patentability 
explicably because these are the “basic tools of scientific and technological work”80, i.e. the 
exclusion was policy oriented; while in Europe, discoveries were excluded because they were 
“abstract”, “intellectual”, and “non-technical” in character. Similar to exclusions, different 
rationalities justify the same exceptions to the patentee’s rights. 
Providing justifications for exceptions, states refer to the core rationale behind patent law and 
become unavoidably engaged in weighing different interests. CL as a patent law exception relies 
on a variety of justifications in different countries, but it always involves the weighing of the 
incentive to invest in R&D against other social-economic goals, such as public health. States 
engage in the cost-benefit analysis that strives to preserve the high level of incentive to research 
at a low social cost. Exceptions reflect the fact that a significant goal of patent law to safeguard 
the incentive to R&D sometimes collides with other goals that have a higher importance, and CLs 
exemplify such a state of affairs. Sometimes countries such as India, Brazil, and Thailand rely on 
CLs to promote public health on the cost of the incentive to R&D. The current paradigm of patent 
limitation is undergoing changes. 
TRIPS provoked important developments in patent law by changing the forum of influence that 
international norms came to play a significant role, and the Agreement reversed the expansion 
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process that had been occurring over the last century81. The limitation of exclusions is the objective 
on the way to achieve the goal of patent regime harmonization, which relies on the principle of 
universal patent protection. In turn, the principle demands that patents should be available “in all 
fields of technology”, and TRIPS maintains in this regard that state members cannot exclude 
pharmaceutical products and processes from patent eligibility82. TRIPS had the profound impact 
on exclusions in national law, namely, it reduced dramatically the number of subject matters that 
were previously excluded from patentability, and therefore very few modern national patent laws 
contain exceptions relating to food or medicines. While the position in relation to exclusions is 
relatively straightforward in the post-TRIPS patent law, the situation in relation to exceptions is 
more complicated. International patent law reduces the number of exclusions, but it does not limit 
exceptions that states can incorporate in their patent laws, and therefore states enjoy the 
considerable discretion in implementing exceptions in their patent legislations. 
However, Article 30 TRIPS limits the discretion by imposing a three-step test that implies that 
prospective exceptions must be duly limited, but they must not unreasonably conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the patent, or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner. Reviewing the Canada-Pharmaceutical case in 2000, the WTO Panel employed the three-
step test to consider the regulatory review and stockpiling exception. The regulatory review or 
“Bolar” exception allowed generic manufacturers to use patented medicines in order to obtain 
marketing approval for their generic analogues, while the stockpiling exception allowed generic 
manufacturers to accumulate generics so the manufacturers could enter the market as soon as the 
relevant patent expired. The panel upheld the regulatory review exception, but found the 
stockpiling exception to be inconsistent with TRIPS83, and therefore provoked the strong criticism 
based on Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration84. Considering the developments within the 
international patent law, it should be noticed that exceptions such as CLs prosper in the post-TRIPS 
landscape. 
The post-TRIPS period shows a continuation of the standardization process such as further 
standardization of exceptions that relies on bilateral treaties, particularly free trade agreements, 
which set TRIPS-plus standards. The important WTO state members such as the US, the EU, and 
Japan support the standardization. In its submission for Special 301 US Trade Report 2015, 
championing to eliminate F2W and other CL grounds, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America maintained that a CL for a patent covering a medicine is granted only 
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when there is a true health emergency and as a measure of last resort85. Promoting the TRIPS-plus 
standard, developed countries selectively export their patent law, focusing on the export of 
protections rather than exceptions. But succeeding in this is difficult86; it requires convincing the 
poorest countries to adopt the same as or a higher patent protection than exists in developed 
countries and the inclusion of a broader group of states, such as in multilateral negotiation in the 
WTO. This is something bilateral negotiation cannot provide, and therefore the future of the 
TRIPS-plus regime is uncertain. The trend that currently dominates patent law discourse is 
characterized by the growing reliance on exceptions, such as when the need to limit patent rights 
arises and policymakers rely on creating new exceptions rather than excluding subject matter. The 
increased reliance on exceptions as a way of limiting patent rights can be seen in the proliferation 
of CLs87. Many countries made use of CL provisions to ensure A2M, and therefore the shift from 
exclusions to exceptions in the international patent law elevated the role of CLs. Such reliance is 
the consequence of the fact that TRIPS limits the extent to which exclusions can be used to 
implement policy goals, and therefore, in Europe, exclusions were replaced by the “inventive step” 
as a way of reining patent rights88. 
Similar to setting high standards for the “inventive step”, CLs can be also considered as a way of 
drifting away from the patent regulation that relies on exclusions. While exclusions imply the blunt 
all-or-nothing nature, which remove rather than balance or reduce incentives to invest in R&D, 
CLs can allow policymakers to develop nuanced ways of reconciling conflicting interests. This 
CL feature stems from such grounds as F2W, that provide CLs with their necessary flexibilities. 
Hence, the central role of CLs, among other patent limitations, depends on relevant grounds. This 
finding will be considered in the last chapter in relation to the capacity of F2W to promote A2M. 
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3  Chapter Three: The Interface between Human Rights and Patent Law: The Correlation between 
Access to Medicines and “Failure to Work” 
3.1 The convergence of Access to Medicines and “Failure to Work” 
In the previous chapter, it was established that Article 27(1) of TRIPS diminishes the feature of 
F2W, such as local manufacturing, and therefore, having this feature somewhat neglected, F2W 
became an uncertain legal category. Searching for a sustainable interpretation for the CL ground, 
it is reasonable to refer to Article 8(1) TRIPS and Article 4 of the Doha Declaration which maintain 
that the CL mechanism should be interpreted and implemented in a public health protective manner 
and, in particular, to promote A2M. The articles are also applicable in relation to working 
requirement due to the fact that it constitutes a part of the CL mechanism, and therefore the need 
to consider A2M, the category of the human rights discourse, arises. Numerous human rights 
instruments recognize A2M, while some of these legal documents provide the content of A2M. In 
this chapter, I will review relevant theories on the interface between human rights and patent law 
to consider different justifications for interpreting F2W in the light of A2M. 
 
3.1.1 Subjugation 
The subjugation approach exists in many variations, but all of them frame patent rights as 
conflicting with fundamental human rights. They prioritize human rights over patent rights. 
Endorsing the subjugation approach, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (the 
Commission) stated that, “conflicts exist between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
and the realization of economic, social and cultural rights” 89. In addition, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ESC Committee) maintained “any intellectual property 
regime that makes it more difficult … to comply with … obligations in relation to health … [that 
are] set out in [ICESCR], is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party”90. 
According to the Commission, when resolving these conflicts states should recognize “the primacy 
of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements”91. Scholars uphold this 
approach, for instance, Drahos and Brathwaite argue that, “in any principled national legal system, 
basic human rights to health … take precedence over (trump) utilitarian considerations”92. 
Moreover, Paul Torremans claims that, “this solution imposes itself in the view of its proponents 
because in normative terms human rights are fundamental and of higher importance than 
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intellectual property rights”93. In advancing the framing of human rights and patent rights as being 
in conflict, scholars point to real life cases, such as HIV/AIDS medication being unavailable to the 
millions infected in Sub-Saharan Africa or pharmaceutical companies neglecting third-world 
diseases. In particular, Hoachem Sun provides a typical example of this approach and argues that 
intellectual property laws should be shaped in the public health perspective94, he cites CL as a 
valuable tool to achieve the protection of human health within the context of intellectual property 
regimes95. Supporting the subjugation approach, Brinkhof asserts that the patent law history and 
the analysis of human rights instruments reveal that patent rights lack the human rights status, and 
therefore, in the event of a collision, patent rights, being subordinate to human rights, must yield96. 
While the subjugation approach seems conceptually straightforward, it has some ambiguities. If 
patents imperil the right to health, the subjugation approach requires human rights to trump patent 
rights by providing various mechanisms for this “trumping” to occur97. One popularly held view 
claims that in the situation of a clear conflict between human rights and patents, limitations on 
patent rights within national legislation should be created98. If framed narrowly, a conflict arises 
only when two legal rules are mutually inconsistent such that the state’s compliance with one rule 
necessarily compels it to violate another. Some human rights such as the prohibitions on slavery 
and torture are categorical rules whose jus cogens status gives them undisputed primacy over other 
obligations, but the human rights that intersect with patent rights, such as the right to health, are 
open-textured. Therefore, it is unclear which international human right being breached is sufficient 
to trigger the subjugation of patent rights. Moreover, allowing human rights to suppress patent 
rights, the approach does not indicate how explicit a violation of those human rights must be before 
subjugation is required. 
 
3.1.2 Integration 
By giving patent rights a human rights status, the integration approach assimilates patent rights 
into human rights analysis99 and regards patents as a part of human rights law, whereas the 
subjugation approach introduces human rights considerations into patent policy and views patent 
rights and human rights as distinct and potentially conflicting areas of law. Proponents of the 
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integration approach argue that patent rights are essentially the same as property in tangible assets, 
and therefore must be secured by the same legal guarantees. Drawing on the Constitution of the 
US and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Giovanetti and Matthews 
assert that the protection of patent rights has long been recognized as a basic human right and those 
concerned about human rights made a conscious and concerted effort to ensure that patent rights 
are protected100. Approaching patent rights as human rights in the context of CL, scholars point to 
the human right to profit from one’s invention that is stipulated in Article 27(2) UDHR that states, 
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. 
Defending a human right status of the right to profit from one’s invention, Chapman refers to 
Article 15(1) ICESCR that maintains, “the right of everyone … [t]o benefit from the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author”. According to her, the rights of creators are not just good in themselves, 
but should be understood as essential preconditions for cultural freedom and scientific progress101. 
Postulating that the rights of the creator are not absolute but conditional on contributing to the 
common good and welfare of society, the integration approach makes an implicit balance between 
the rights of inventors and the interest of the wider society more explicit. Envisioning an 
implementation of this approach, she asserts that human rights considerations should impose 
conditions on the manner in which patentees’ rights are protected in intellectual property regimes 
and assure that the rights of the patentee facilitate rather than constrain access102. Considering 
property provisions made by international human rights instruments covering patent rights, 
scholars regard patent and other intellectual property rights as being incorporated into the family 
of core human rights at the international level. Integration arguments adopt a point that is logically 
removed from the specific language of patent law instruments such as TRIPS. 
Whereas the subjugation approach takes patent law to have a fixed meaning that are subject to 
human rights analysis, the integrated approach determines the meanings of patent rights and other 
human rights in conjunction with one another103. While the subjugation approach implies that the 
inalienable nature of human rights prevents the actual creator of the invention to assign his or her 
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rights to an employer104, the integration approach suggests that a group or a community can be a 
creator, and therefore enjoy human right protection105. 
Nevertheless, the integrated approach raises some concerns. Firstly, Article 27(2) UDHR neither 
refer to the words “patents” or “inventions”, nor the term “scientific production” is necessarily a 
synonym for the term “invention”. The overall tenor of the article is of extreme vagueness as to 
what might be understood under “the right to protection”, and therefore it is not evident that “the 
right to protect” includes patent protection. Secondly, Article 15 ICESCR and Article 27(2) UDHR 
have a similar formulation, so the same points about the uncertain legal wording can be made. In 
particular, the term “benefit” in Article 15 ICESCR is a subtle and open category that includes 
many things, such as public recognition for being the inventor, or the reception of a prize or medal 
as a reward for one’s efforts, but it may exclude patent rights. For instance, in the former Soviet 
Union, inventors were granted not patent rights, but merely a certificate. However, the Soviet 
Union did not introduce a reservation to Article 15 ICESCR, so it is likely that providing inventors 
with a certificate was regarded as a sufficient reward in the light of the term “benefit”106. Finally, 
framing patent rights as human rights would seriously undercut the utilitarian justification of 
patents, which requires states to undertake a careful balancing of interests of inventors, users and 
public, and put such balancing under the weight of the natural rights discourse that is inhered in 
human rights107. Likewise, viewing patents as part of human rights has damaging consequences 
because patents can potentially be used as a “weapon to expand patent rights against the desires of 
impoverished peoples to manufacture or distribute inexpensive versions of patented drugs”108. 
 
3.1.3 Coexistence 
Rather than regarding patents and human rights as pursuing opposite goals, as in the subjugation 
approach, or as two mutually modifying instantiations of universal human rights, as in the 
integrated approach, the coexistence conceptual framework views human rights and patent law as 
independent discourses that are essentially compatible. Despite the fact that regimes operate at 
different levels, in the long term, patent rights and human rights are in a mutually supportive 
relation that increases human welfare by promoting both innovation and access. Heifer argues that, 
intellectual property rights and human rights may be understood to be concerned with the “same 
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fundamental question”, namely, “defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that 
gives authors and inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while ensuring that the 
consuming public has adequate access to fruits of their efforts”109. In the UN human right system, 
the coexistence approach was endorsed in numerous documents such as the High Commissioner’s 
report on TRIPS Agreement110, the statement WTO on the relationship between human rights and 
TRIPS111, and General Comment No. 17 on creators’ rights112. Separating human rights and patent 
rights, General Comment No. 17 describes human rights as being fundamental since they are 
inherent to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property, inter alia, patent rights, are 
first and foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and 
creativity113. 
Many scholars endorse the coexistence approach providing it with a variety of different 
perspectives. Van Overwalle argues that human rights serving as a counter balance can rectify 
patent rights that are centered too one-sidedly on economic calculus114. According to him, patent 
law is a widely accepted tool that fosters the public interest in economic expansion and 
technological progress, but this traditional economic interpretation, which had prevailed for quite 
some time in legal doctrine115, became outdated. There is a clear need for a contemporary 
interpretation of the public interest component in patent law, and therefore human rights should 
be factored into patent law, through the gateway of public interest, so a modern interpretation of 
public interest may accommodate present-day needs. A plausible way to update the public 
component is to “desacralize” and anatomize it in various concrete emanations in a series of 
legislation. An analysis of the public interest concept in legal discourse, in particular, in civil law, 
administrative law, to name a few, demonstrates that public interest is a mosaic encompassing of 
morality, health safety, protection of public health. The human rights pantheon offers a welcome 
supplement to the current public interest concept in patent law by adding such as human dignity, 
food security and access to medicines. 
In the light of the approaches mentioned above, it should be noticed that there are two central flaws 
in attempting to combine human rights and patent law within a single discourse. First, whereas 
human rights and patent rights are rights, they derive from different normative orders, and 
therefore have different justifications116. While a justification for human rights stems from moral 
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and political theory, patent rights obtain its justification from cost-benefit analysis. Second, 
whereas human rights operate at the international level and speak to universal principles, patent 
rights reside at national level and speak to the domestic interest. Human rights derive from 
international conventions and customary law. In contrast, up until the 1980s, patent law resided 
primary at the domestic level and, despite the adaptation of the international trade rules 
surrounding patent law, patents did not fully change their locus to the international level. Being 
patronized by the international trade rules at the international level, patent law was diminished in 
terms of its structure and became a right that the state had no choice but to recognize. 
Weakening the normative orders underlying the human rights and patents, an attempt to 
commensurate the discourses may lead to human rights being treated as contingent rights or patent 
rights being considered having a basis in moral theory117. Framing discourses as being 
commensurable would turn the logic that patents are a tool of the state by actually requiring the 
state to enforce patents, and therefore the state would no longer be able to justify a failure to 
enforce patents by referring to its internal needs. The coexistence approach is more promising it is 
free of the assumption that human rights and patent rights are commensurable and recognizes that 
human rights and patent law are informed by different normative and legal orders. Being far from 
abandoning the ideals of human rights, the coexistence approach strengthen them by enabling the 
discourse over how best to construct a domestic innovation system that is responsive to human 
rights concerns by reinterpreting the notion of public interest. The findings on the approaches will 
be used in the last chapter to determine which approach the Indian regulator adopted in the Bayer 
Nexavar case. 
 
3.2 The Content of Access to Medicines 
The right of access to public health is proclaimed in UDHR, which stipulates that “[e]veryone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care”118. Even more, the right is equally guaranteed 
in ICESCR, which maintains that “[states] recognize the right to everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”119. Likewise, the Oviedo Convention 
provides that “[p]arties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take 
appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health 
                                                 
117 Gold (2004) p. 263  
118 UDHR, Art.25(1) 
119 ICESCR, Art.12(1) 
29 
 
care of appropriate quality”120. Hence, states are required to strike an adequate balance between 
their obligations in relation to the right to health and the moral and material interest of authors. 
Moreover, a confluence of several factors such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and a 
growing awareness of the adverse consequences of those pandemics have engendered the 
assentation that the right to health encompasses a right of access to lifesaving medicines. 
A rapid evolution of the normative content of A2M occurred in the decade following the adaptation 
of General Comment No. 14 on the right to health, which states that “the right to health must be 
understood as a right to the enjoyment of … goods [that are] necessary for the realization of the 
highest attainable standard of health”121. In addition, statements endorsing A2M appeared in 
numerous human rights documents such as the UN General Assembly Declaration122, the 
resolution of the Commission on Human Rights123, the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health124, and General Comment No. 3 of the Commission on the Rights of the Child125, 
to name a few. Commentators have bolstered these statements with analyses that draw upon other 
human rights, including the right to life, the right to share in the benefits of scientific progress, and 
the right to non-discrimination126. Numerous documents assert the universal right of access to 
pharmaceutical and medical technologies without expressly indicating whether those technologies 
are protected by patents or what the consequence of such protection is. Few of the documents that 
have been mentioned above address the issue of patented medicines indirectly. For instance, 
General Comment No. 3 asserts that the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires state parties 
to “ensur[e] that children have sustained and equal access to … HIV-related drugs”127. 
Presumably, patents protect these medicines, but the comment urges states to “negotiate with the 
pharmaceutical industry in order to make the necessary medicines locally available at the lowest 
cost possible”128. Likewise, the Declaration of UN General Assembly on HIV/AIDS asserts that 
“the cost, availability and affordability of drugs and related technology are significant factors 
[relating to access to medicines] and that there is a need to reduce the cost of these drugs and 
technologies in close collaboration with the private sector and pharmaceutical companies”129. In 
the light of the relation between patents and A2M, it should be noticed that according to several 
commentators the progressive realization approach undermines the universality of A2M and 
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provides insufficient guidance to states concerning their legal obligations130. In response to this 
criticism, General Comment No. 14 provided a detailed normative content of the right to health 
that would allow states to comply with their obligations, inter alia, in relation to A2M. Being 
highly influential on subsequent interpretations and analyses of the right by governments, judges, 
and commentators, the comment asserts that the right to health contains such essential elements as 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality131. In the light of the Declaration of UN 
General Assembly on HIV/AIDS, it appears that the most relevant features for A2M would be 
availability and accessibility, since A2M is narrower in scope than the right to health, that includes 
health facilities, services and medical ethics, to name a few. 
 
3.2.1 Availability and Affordability 
General Comment No. 14 treats A2M as only one facet of a broader cluster of issues relating to 
the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of the determinants of health132. 
Considering availability, the ESC Committee maintains that this element requires a state to take 
measures to make available “[f]unctioning public health and health care facilities, goods and 
services, as well as programs”133. The composition of these “health goods” will vary depending 
on numerous factors, among them the developmental level of a country. Bearing in mind the 
progressive realization of A2M, availability implies that a state should strive to ensure the 
reasonable quantum and the expanded range of medicines that includes, inter alia, the most 
advanced drugs to meet the needs of its population134. 
According to the ESC Committee, accessibility has four overlapping dimensions such as non-
discrimination, physical accessibility, and affordability. The last aspect of accessibility implies 
that payment for medicines is based on the principle of equity, that poorer households are not 
disproportionately burdened with health expenses compared with richer households, and 
information accessibility135. Granted CLs indicate that a national patent regulator gives primary 
consideration to such aspects of accessibility as physical accessibility and affordability136. It 
should be noticed that human rights treaty monitoring bodies and NGOs regularly express their 
concern with the lack of physical accessibility of drugs. For example, the Austrian Research 
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Institute ÖBIG Forschungs- und Planungsgesellschaft mbH (ÖBIG FP), in its concluding 
observations for Poland, expressed its concern thus: “depending on where the patient lives, he/she 
has different access to medicines [and] patients living in rural areas have more limited access to 
medicines [than patients living in major cities do]”137. The same concerns are common in the 
concluding observations of the CRC Committee. For instance, in its observations for Guinea 
Bissau, it expressed concern for “the limited access to, capacity and quality of health‐care services, 
including in terms of distance between people's homes and health facilities … and the limited 
availability of affordable and appropriate medication”138. It therefore recommended that the state 
party “significantly improve children’s access to … medication … by strengthening the quality 
and capacity of health infrastructure”139. Financial accessibility, i.e. affordability, is an enduring 
concern for human rights. A health system that is beyond the financial means of people cannot be 
said to promote the effective enjoyment of the right to health. ÖBIG FP in its report observed that 
“in terms of affordability, the patient co-payment has been noted as very high in Poland. In 2007, 
private pharmaceutical expenditure amounted to 62% of the total pharmaceutical expenditure”140.  
It should be noticed that General Comment 14 recognizes that while States are ultimately 
responsible for compliance with the Covenant, all members of society, including the private 
business sector, have responsibilities regarding the realization of fundamental elements of the right 
to health, such as physical accessibility and affordability. The ESC Committee noticed that 
“[v]iolations of the right to health can occur through the direct action of States or other entities 
insufficiently regulated by States”141. The obligation to protect the right to health includes the 
commitment to prevent individuals, groups or corporations from impeding A2M. Being 
unambiguous about A2M when it is concerned about health policy or drugs distribution, General 
Comment 14 states that “the failure to adopt or implement a national health policy designed to 
ensure the right to health for everyone [or] take measure to reduce the inequitable distribution of 
health … goods [constitutes a violation of the obligation to fulfill]142”. It appears from the 
comment that if patent policy is contiguous to health policy, the first one should be shaped in such 
a way to avoid a violation of the obligation to fulfill. 
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4 Chapter four: The analysis of the Bayer Nexavar case 
4.1 Bayer Corporation in India 
In the 1990s, Bayer Corporation, an internationally renowned manufacturer of innovative drugs, 
invented a compound called “Sorafenib”, useful in the treatment of advanced stage liver and 
kidney cancer. Bayer first applied for a patent in the US Patent and Trade Mark Office in January 
1999. Improving “Sorafenib”, the patentee created the invention called “Sorafenib Tosylate”. In 
2005, the new drug was launched under the trade name Nexavar for treatment of Renal Cell 
Carcinoma-RCC (kidney cancer). Subsequently, the medicine received additional approval for 
treatment of Hepatocellular Carcinoma-HCC (liver cancer) in 2007. Nexavar stops the growth of 
new blood vessels and targets other important cellular growth factors. It is not a life-saving drug, 
but a life extending one, i.e. in the case of kidney cancer the life of a patient can be extended by 
4-5 years, while in the case of liver cancer the life of a patient can be extended by about 6-8 months. 
The pharmaceutical corporation has also obtained patents for the same drug in many European 
countries. After examination under the provisions of the Indian Patent Act, the patent was granted 
to the corporation in March 2008. Relying on the patent, the patentee received the regulatory 
approval for importing and marketing the drug, and launched it, as well as in other countries, under 
the brand name Nexavar in India. Bayer Corporation manufactured the drug outside India, and the 
sale of Nexavar depended completely on import. During the first year after the patent was granted 
the patentee did not import the drug at all, while in 2009 and 2010 the corporation imported the 
medicine only in small quantities. Bayer Corporation set the price on the drug at 280 428 rupees 
(more than 5000 USD) as a cost for monthly therapy. In 2011, Natco Pharma Limited (Natco), a 
leading Indian manufacturer and distributor of various generic drugs, approached Bayer 
Corporation with a voluntary license request to manufacture and sell Nexavar, but the corporation 
declined the request. Being unable to negotiate a voluntary license, Natco filed an application for 
CL under Section 84(1) of the Indian Patent Act in July 2011. In the application, Natco proposed 
to sell the drug at a price of 8800 rupees (less than 200 USD) for one month of therapy. Accepting 
the range of CL grounds raised by Natco, among them F2W, the Indian Controller of Patents (the 
Controller) granted the generic drug manufacturer the CL. Appealing the decision, the patentee 
challenged the interpretation of F2W as being in violation with the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
4.2. Before the Indian Controller of Patents in Mumbai 
As has been mentioned above, a CL that can be issued under Article 31 TRIPS is subject to strict 
requirements that limit states’ freedom of action in this regard. These conditions are more stringent 
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than the ones in the Paris Convention, in particular Article 5(A)(2) that provides that states shall 
have the right to take legislative measures providing the grant of CLs on the F2W ground. The 
article also adds that CLs should be refused if the patentee justifies his or her inaction by legitimate 
reasons. The provision neither mandates strict requirements for the issuance of a CL, nor covers 
other types of CLs than the ones that are issued on the F2W ground. Article (5)(A)(2) of the Paris 
Convention has been incorporated into TRIPS along with Article 5(A)(1). Despite the fact that the 
latter provision is not related to CLs directly, it is relevant for the purposes of the analysis. The 
article states that import of patented products by the patent owner does not entail forfeiture of the 
patent. Considering this provision, the Controller of Patents in the Bayer Nexavar case concluded 
that the mere import of patented goods might still entail “something less than forfeiture, such as a 
compulsory license”143. Therefore, in the case at hand, the Controller held that the mere import of 
a patented medicine does not bar the issuance of the CL. The year following the one in which the 
patent was granted, Bayer did not import Nexavar into India at all. Three years later, in 2011, the 
corporation imported and sold merely 593 boxes of drugs, while the annual demand for the 
medicine was about 70 000 boxes144. Following the logic of the Controller in relation to Article 
5(A)(1), it could be argued that a local production of Nexavar by Bayer or a licensee authorized 
by it would prevent the granting of the CL. However, this did not occur in the case. 
The Controller pointed out that despite having manufacturing plants in India for several products, 
including oncology-related drugs145, Bayer did not produce any pills of Nexavar. No obstacle 
prevented Bayer from manufacturing medicine locally or granting a voluntary license to other 
generics manufacturers including Natco146. The Controller rejected Bayer’s argument that the 
small quantities of drugs required in India did not justify setting up manufacturing plants in the 
country147. Reaching its decision, the Controller relied on three provisions of the Indian Patent 
Act, i.e. Section 83(b), (c) and (f)148. The first provision states that patents are not granted merely 
to allow patent owners to enjoy monopolistic rights for the import of the patented goods. The 
second one provides that the issuance of patents should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology. The third article 
states that the patentee enjoying his or her patent rights should not engage in practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or jeopardize the international dissemination of technology. The 
Controller stressed that Section 83(c) and (f) are very important because provisions confirm the 
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principle that patent owners are obliged to contribute towards the national and international 
transfer of technology, and therefore their rights and obligations should be balanced. Reflecting 
on the issue of how the patentee could fulfill the dissemination of technology requirement, the 
Controller asserted that the patent owner should either produce the patented product himself or 
herself in loco or grant a local third party a license to manufacture it. Oddly enough, in this specific 
regard, the Controller did not refer to Article 7 TRIPS, which states that the protection of 
intellectual property should contribute to the transfer and dissemination of technological 
innovation, or Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration, which provides countries with the freedom 
to determine CL grounds. It appears that the Controller’s findings do not give due consideration 
to the TRIPS debate surrounding F2W and may be in violation of TRIPS itself. 
It is believed that Articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention as well as Article 31 TRIPS 
have to be read and interpreted together with Article 27(1) TRIPS, according to which “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to … whether the products 
are imported or locally produced”. In other words, this provision clarifies that if a national 
legislation imposes a local working requirement, like the Indian Patent Act, a patentee should have 
the opportunity to satisfy such requirement by demonstrating that it has imported the patented 
product in the country in question. There is no doubt that, contrary to what is affirmed by the 
Controller of Patents149, under TRIPS the concept of F2W includes both the local production and 
the import of patented goods150. Article 27(1) has therefore an impact on the issuance of CLs. This 
conclusion is confirmed by the WTO Panel’s decision in Canada - Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products - where it was held that the non-discrimination or technological neutrality 
principle under Article 27(1) also applies to Article 31151. It follows that, when resorting to CLs, 
states are not allowed to discriminate based on whether products are imported or locally 
manufactured. Hence, Article 27(1) should be interpreted as not allowing any limitation of patent 
rights, including the issuance of CLs, merely because the patentee does not produce the patented 
invention locally. Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration could not be invoked to justify the need 
of a local production requirement. As mentioned above, the paragraph should indeed be read in 
the broader context of TRIPS and in particular in the light of Article 27(1), which mandates the 
principle of technological neutrality. This interpretation of Article 27(1) is in line with the spirit 
and aim of TRIPS and WTO and jeopardizes neither the dissemination of technology nor the public 
interest in A2M. For instance, governments could still issue CLs if patented products imported by 
the patentee, or with his or her consent, do not satisfy the local demand, or are sold at an 
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unaffordable price. This is what happened in the Bayer Nexavar case. Bayer did not import 
Nexavar in India at all in 2008. In 2009 and 2010, the corporation imported and sold at the high 
price just small quantities of the drug152. It is believed that relying on these circumstances 
interpreting working requirement would render a more TRIPS-compliant definition of F2W that 
would acquire support of both Article 27(1) TRIPS and Article 5(A)(1) of the Paris Convention. 
As has been explained above, the Controller based his incorrect finding on the local production 
requirement. Justifying its reasoning, the Controller referred to a certain provision of the Indian 
Patent Act, i.e. Section 83(b). This provision states that patents should not be granted merely to 
allow patent owners to enjoy monopolistic rights for import of the goods. Reliance on the national 
provision to justify its position neither provides a safe harbor for Indian CLs nor excludes the 
alleged infringement of Article 27(1) TRIPS. Due account must be taken of Article 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties which maintains that “a party may not invoke the 
provision of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”.  
Providing the interpretation for working requirement, the Controller envisaged F2W one-sidedly. 
In the part of the decision that is devoted to the F2W ground, the Controller referred only to Article 
27(1) TRIPS, but he failed to refer to Article 8(1) TRIPS, which seems appropriate to mention due 
to the public health dimension of the case. Rather than adopting human rights wording and express 
F2W through such categories as availability and accessibility, the Controller adhered to the 
conservative reading of the term that dates back to the emergence of patent law when patents 
served as a mean of protectionism. The Controller relied on the category “commercial scale”, 
further adding that this category is not sufficient and that it is “something more than that”. From 
the wording of the decision, it appears that “something more than that” implies “local 
manufacturing”.  Both “a commercial scale” and “local manufacturing” are mainly economical 
terms, and therefore it is doubtful that they could accommodate the human rights dimension of the 
case. In contrast, elaborating on availability and accessibility of the drug as conditions of working 
requirement might strengthen the decision by giving due regard to the human rights aspect. The 
way that the Controller approached the issue may resemble the subjugation approach. Indeed, the 
TRIPS provision that obliges states to provide medicines with patents and their obligation in 
relation to health are not mutually exclusive per se. Thus, a state may fulfill its obligation in 
relation to health by regulating prices on medicines or launching national drug programs funded 
by the state, and therefore try to avoid engaging in issuing CLs. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
Controller did not adopt any approach, and failed to recognize the collision between different sets 
of rights at all. If the Controller adopted the subjugation approach, he would at least give some 
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acknowledgment to A2M, providing the interpretation to working requirement. Moreover, if the 
subjugation approach has been employed, the Controller would assess F2W through the prism of 
the public interest in transfer and dissemination of technology rather than through the prism of 
A2M. Without reservation, absence of local manufacturing slows down the transfer of technology, 
but does not eliminate it since the patentee still has to reveal an invention to a national patent 
office. However, the Controller was especially insistent on the local manufacturing requirement, 
so one may conclude that he viewed the issue through the prism of protectionism denying the 
foreign patentee his patent rights on the mere ground of lack of local manufacturing. The 
Controller did not prioritize the public interest in transfer and the dissemination of technology over 
the public interest in A2M, which is disputable due to the background of the case, but would still 
be understandable in the light of the unsettled relations between the discourses; nevertheless, he 
embraced protectionism as the relevant public interest, which violates principles of TRIPS. Hence, 
the Controller provided the interpretation of F2W, which is neither legally appropriate nor 
sustainable under any of the approaches towards the interface between human and patent rights 
mentioned earlier. Such an interpretation not only diminishes the role of human rights in the patent 
law discourse, but it also imperils patients whose health depends on affordable Indian generics by 
rendering the Indian CL mechanism in violation with TRIPS and the generics industry vulnerable 
to quarrels under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
 
4.3 Before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board in Chennai 
Appealing the decision of the Controller, Bayer claimed that the Controller erroneously concluded 
that the manufacture in India was necessary to meet the “working” requirement under Section 
84(1)(c) of the Indian Patent Act153. According to him, deciding on the merits of the case, the 
Controller did not give due consideration to the relevant international provisions. Starting its 
analysis of F2W, the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (the Board) questioned whether 
“working” means “local manufacture”154. Further, the regulator went on assuming that if it would 
accept that mere import would satisfy the working requirement, such import would have to be 
done on a commercial scale to adequate extent and sold at a reasonable price155. Before going 
into details, it should be noticed that the wording adopted by the Board, such as “reasonable price”, 
reminds of human rights language adopted in relation to A2M. Preliminary accepting import as a 
way to fulfill the working requirement, the regulator proceeded to tackle the term “working the 
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invention on a commercial scale”. The Board referred to Bayer’s previous submission on providing 
patients with the drug through its Patient Assistance Programs (PAP). The Board explained the 
term “working the invention on a commercial scale” by confronting it to PAP, and maintained that 
“[t]hese programmes are at the discretion of the appellant and not the market price”156. Moreover, 
the Board also endorsed the findings of the Controller in relation to PAP’s insufficiency to fulfill 
the working requirement by stating that “[t]he Controller has held that the philanthropic proposals 
cannot be taken into account while construing the expression, ‘working the invention on a 
commercial scale to an adequate extent’”. Considering this explanation, it should be assumed that 
“working the invention on a commercial scale” implies that the drug is available at nobody’s 
discretion and in an unlimited amount; unlike under PAP, which provided certain patient groups 
with cheaper medicines, the medicine should be sold at a regular market price. It appears that the 
regulator repeated itself by stating “reasonable price” and “the market price”, since the terms, 
prima facie, imply the same meaning. However, it can be viewed as a way of putting emphasis on 
the affordability of the drug. The Board reviewed to which extent R&D costs might affect the 
market price by stating that “[t]he R&D costs cited are [not relevant and] what we have to look at 
is the market price … at which the invention is made available to the public”157. Hence, treating 
the R&D costs in this way is an indication of prioritizing A2M over the promotion of technological 
innovation, or more generally patients over patents. Next, the regulator narrowed its scope of 
inquiry to the sole term “work”. Considering the term, the Board addressed two of Bayer’s 
arguments. First, Bayer argued that due to the nature of the invention it was difficult for Bayer’s 
Nexavar to enter the market because the corporation had to convince many oncologists so that they 
would prescribe the patented invention to their patients. The Board dismissed the argument 
because the three-year period after the patent was granted as prescribed by the Paris Convention158 
and the Indian Patent Act159 had elapsed. More importantly, dismissing the argument the regulator 
concluded “three years would be sufficient for an inventor to work his invention in the territory of 
India and make the supply meet the demand at a reasonably affordable price”160. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that if Bayer did met the demand even through mere export, it would 
constitute “work”. Second, Bayer claimed that due to the sales of CIPLA, a patent infringer that 
produced and sold the analog for Nexavar, the adequate supply was provided. The Board dismissed 
the argument concluding that the sales of CIPLA could not be taken into account because the 
obligation to provide the adequate supply lay only on the patentee. More importantly, the regulator 
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went on to emphasize the difference between what is meant by commercial sales and what is meant 
by patient support. Apparently, the aim of the Board was to demonstrate the dramatic difference 
in relation to the amount of drugs that could be provided through these forms of distribution. Even 
more, examining the term “commercial sales”, the regulator pointed to the negligible amount of 
commercial sale units that were imported in 2010 and their prohibitively high price161. The relevant 
paragraphs of the decision reveal that the term “work” is consistently linked or accompanied by 
terms such as “reasonably affordable price”, “adequate supply”, or “meeting the demand”, and for 
that reason it can be argued that the expression “working” in Section 84 takes color from these 
terms. 
Further, the Board moved on considering whether local working implies local manufacturing in 
the sense that the patented invention must be assembled in the country. Approaching the issue, the 
regulator proclaimed that the international conventions and Indian law must be read harmoniously. 
The regulator recalled the Controller’s point that import could entail something less than forfeiture, 
such as CLs. Bearing this point in mind, the Board as the Controller referred to the Indian Patent 
Act and noticed that the law uses both the terms “working” and “import” in the same sections at 
the same time and not synonymously162. The regulator went on to consult with the general 
principles applicable to the working of patented inventions; in particular, he considered Section 
83(b) which says that the patents are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly 
for the importation of the patented articles, and Section 83(c) which refers to the transfer and 
dissemination of technological knowledge. Further, the Board reviewed several provisions under 
Section 84, which regulates CLs; among these, 84(7)(e) that speaks of the working of invention 
being prevented or hindered by import, and 84(7)(a)(iv) that refers to the establishment or 
development of commercial activities in India being prejudiced. The selection of relevant articles 
and the tone of the paragraph reminds of the Controller’s reasoning. Nevertheless, the Board 
arrived to quite a different conclusion by stating that “[i]n a given case there may be an invention 
which cannot be manufactured in India [or] an invention where the reasonable requirement of 
public itself is [so] small [that] setting up a factory just for the said purpose is not practicable” 163. 
Hence, relying on the national patent law the regulator was somewhat willing to admit that in 
certain cases actual manufacturing in India is not obligatory to fulfill the working requirement. 
Then, proceeding to international patent law, the Board elaborated on the case-to-case nature of 
CLs and concluded that it cannot decide that “working” totally excludes or is synonymous to 
import. The regulator stated that the patentee must show why the patented invention could not be 
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locally manufactured; but a mere statement, as Bayer did in the case, is not sufficient and must be 
provided with evidence164. Despite the fact that the Board placed the burden of proof on the 
patentee, making him or her responsible to provide evidence of impossibility to manufacture the 
patented invention locally, it confirmed the right of the patentee to exercise his or her exclusive 
patent rights through mere export. Distinguishing its position from the position of the Controller, 
the regulator stated that “[the Controller is] of the opinion that the word “worked” has a flexible 
meaning, and to that extent we differ from the Controller”165. It should be recalled that the 
Controller elaborated on the local manufacturing obligations of the compulsory licensee and 
extrapolated these obligations on the patentee. It appears that such a way of assigning obligations 
is fallacious due to the nature of patent rights. Whereas the full set of patent rights originally belong 
to the patentee, the compulsory licensee receives the limited secondary set of patent rights, which 
is of a derivate nature in relation to the initial set of exclusive patent rights that is granted by a 
state to the patentee. Such a method of granting patent rights reflects one of the objectives of patent 
law, which is favoring the patentee. Therefore, similar to when it comes granting patent rights, the 
patentee should be privileged when it comes assigning obligations. The legal position that was 
adopted by the Board comes under this mode of reasoning because the patentee can still exercise 
his or her rights through mere export if an inexpediency of local manufacturing is proved, while 
the compulsory licensee, in any circumstances, cannot use his or her CLs to import the patented 
invention. Hence, concluding that the term “worked” has a flexible meaning that takes the color 
of “availability” and “accessibility” as well as maybe encompassing only import, the Board 
rendered Indian working requirement as being TRIPS-compliant. 
The regulator centrally gave some consideration to the human rights aspect of the case. Starting 
an analysis with the human rights dimension, the Board referred to Paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Doha 
Declaration. Paragraph 6 was referred to for the sake of an appropriate legal analysis, which relied 
on justified legal terminology. Doing so, the Board confirmed its previous conclusion on Article 
31 TRIPS that “other use without authorization of the right holder” includes CLs. Otherwise, India 
could hardly be considered as a WTO member, with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector, to take advantage of Paragraph 6. In contrast, Paragraph 4 was 
mentioned due to reasons that are more substantial. Referring to the paragraph, the Board 
emphasized the discretion in granting CLs that are exercised by states when safeguarding the 
public interest such as A2M. Even more, pursuing this thread of reasoning, the regulator admitted 
A2M as “the running theme”166. Such an affirmative position in relation to A2M clearly indicates 
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that the Board acknowledged the collision between patent and human rights.  As has been 
mentioned above, the regulator expressed F2W or the absence of working requirement in a variety 
of different terms such as “a commercial scale to an adequate extent”, “reasonable price”, “the 
market price”, and “commercial sales”, to name a few. Despite this diversity of legal terms, they 
can be boiled down to the two human rights categories “availability” and “affordability”. As 
mentioned above, the subjugation approach implies that terms of patent law have fixed meanings, 
which in turn become subjects to human rights analysis. However, the opinion of the Board that 
the word “worked” has a flexible meaning, and that it therefore must be decided on a case-to-case 
basis, testifies against the fact that the regulator adopted the subjugation approach. Considering 
this co-existing approach, it should be recalled that the way through which the approach plays out 
in practice remains nebulous, but scholars agree on its main features such as human rights and 
patent rights cannot directly modify one another. Without reservations, reliance on “availability” 
and “affordability” in interpreting the term “work” indicates a direct conversion between the 
discourses. Thus, it can hardly be argued that the Board embraced the co-existing approach 
interpreting F2W. It appears that in defining the term, the regulator employed human rights 
categories. On a small scale, when the Board operated with large complex categories such as “a 
commercial scale to an adequate extent”, “market price”, or “a commercial scale”, to name a few, 
it resembled patent law analysis. However, in a detailed approximation, when the regulator 
explained the term “a commercial scale to an adequate extent” by opposing it to PAP and broke 
the term up into minor categories such as “reasonable price” and “availability”, it became evident 
that he engaged in a human rights analysis. The integration approach postulates that patent law 
does not have fixed meanings, but that they should be determined in conjunction with the relevant 
human rights categories. The board postulated pretty much the same thing by stating that “the word 
‘worked’ has a flexible meaning”. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the Board adopted the 
integration approach towards the interface between patent and human rights in the given case. 
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4.4 On the Ability of “Failure to Work” Promoting Access to Medicines  
As discussed in the second chapter, F2W as a CL ground has some distinctive features among 
other CL grounds. F2W is the only one that is explicitly recognized at the international level, and 
it received such recognition quite early at the end of the nineteenth century when the Paris 
Convention was adopted, boosting the process of incorporation of F2W into the majority of 
national patent laws. Countries such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand and India, to name a few, 
recognize F2W as a CL ground in their national patent laws. The combination of the recognition 
of the ground at the international and national levels and its ample application by national patent 
offices provided F2W with a customary status that other CL grounds have not gained yet. Thereby, 
it is reasonable to argue that the exceptional status of F2W facilitates national authorities’ resorting 
to CL when promoting A2M. 
As has been observed above, invoking a CL on the F2W ground indispensably entails certain 
consequences in relation to scope and duration, prior negotiation and the payment of a royalty. 
Considering the relation between F2W and the scope and duration of a CL, it should be noticed 
that this relation is of a flexible nature. These consequences are not particularly pre-defined, but 
rather follow from the nature of F2W, such as “availability” and “affordability”. The flexible 
nature, in turn, provides a national patent regulator with some discretion in tailoring a CL 
according to local needs and resources. Granting the CL in the Bayer Nexavar case, the Controller 
set such terms and conditions as a maximum price of the drug and the obligation of the license to 
supply at least 600 needy patients per year at a free cost167, to name a few. It can be argued that 
these terms and conditions are inherently linked to F2W. The maximum price condition was aimed 
to ensure “affordability” by making the drug financially accessible to low income people. 
Moreover, the obligation to supply needy patients was designed to guarantee “availability” so that 
the drug would become available to poor patients, which otherwise under no circumstances could 
afford it. Therefore, despite the discretion in tailoring a CL, F2W indispensably entails 
“availability” and “affordability” when it comes to setting the terms and conditions of CLs. Hence, 
this feature of F2W reinforces the promotion of A2M.  
As has been mentioned above, F2W necessarily entails prior negotiation and remuneration. 
Addressing the status of prior negotiation, the Board concluded that the single letter from Natco 
that contained an estimated price of the drug produced under a voluntary license constituted a 
“genuine attempt”, and therefore the procedural requirement of the Indian patent law was fully 
met168. It is evident from the Controller’s decision and the Board’s order that this law treats prior 
                                                 
167 Natco v. Bayer p. 61 
168 Bayer v. Natco para.16 
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negotiation as a condition of a CL rather than as an independent ground. It is reasonable to argue 
that despite the fact that prior negotiation prolongs the CL granting procedure and by this weakens 
A2M, in a long term prior negotiation promotes A2M because requiring a potential compulsory 
license to negotiate a voluntary licensee safeguards the patentee’s interest in R&D so that he or 
she can invent new medicines in the future. The same logic is applicable in relation to 
remuneration. Despite the small amount being given to the patentee as a remuneration for a CL, 
he or she is still able to recover a certain part of the expenditure that has been spent on the R&D 
of the drug in question. Hence, it can be argued that F2W obligatory entailing prior negotiation 
and remuneration alleviates the most detrimental effects of CLs on the initiative to R&D and by 
this promotes A2M in the long-term. 
Previously, in the second chapter, CLs were considered among other patent limitations and it was 
concluded that CLs are gaining a wider scope of application due to the decrease in the number of 
patent exclusions. Another reason for the proliferation of CLs in the post-TRIPS landscape is 
conditioned by its inherent flexibility. The Board traced this flexibility in details by analyzing the 
term “work” and stated that it has a flexible meaning, and therefore should be determined on a 
case-to-case basis. F2W demonstrated astonishing flexibility in its reconciliation of opposing 
public interests, such as the promotion of A2M and of technological innovation. It can be argued 
that, in the post-TRIPS environment, this feature of F2W reinforces the CL ground in promoting 
A2M. 
In relation to conceptual dimension of the issue, it can be argued that interpreting F2W through 
human rights categories undoubtedly elevates human rights considerations in the patent law 
discourse. However, the prioritizing of A2M by the means of the integration approach may involve 
adverse implications for the both discourses. As has been observed above, framing patent rights 
as human rights would undermine the utilitarian justification of patent law. Patents would be 
viewed as policy ends themselves rather than means of achieving a variety of social goals ranging 
from wealth creation, through education, to health care. Moreover, it would contribute to a legal 
unpredictability of patent litigations that involve human rights. Such unpredictability, in turn, 
would create uncertainty among pharmaceutical companies making them delay or even withdraw 
their investment in R&D. Unwillingness of pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D will have 
detrimental consequences for the human right to health, in particular to A2M. It appears that A2M 
being a positive human right obligation is predisposed for implementation through policymaking 
rather than through judicial forum. Positive obligations indispensable involve making decisions 
on allocation of resources in society. While judiciary can balance conflicting interest on occasional 
basis, it is in no position to take responsibility for the routine distribution of resources. Providing 
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coherent and holistic policy and legislation in relation to A2M and patents, policymakers would 
facilitate work of judiciary by safeguarding it from being put in position where it has to decide on 
priority of social goals. Therefore, it can be concluded that from the conceptual point of view, 
F2W has an adverse effect for the promotion of A2M.  
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5 Chapter five: Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusion and recommendations 
F2W is a developed and well established at the international and national levels CL ground. 
Originally emerged as a tool of protectionism it has evolved into a legal category that is able to 
safeguard the human right to health, in particular A2M. The recent developments in patent law 
such as the decrease in number of patent exclusions and TRIPS overcompliance rendered F2W as 
a handy instrument to curb the pharmaceutical companies’ profit-seeking behavior. 
Indian judiciary has managed to employ F2W to promote A2M. Doing this, it provided many 
middle and low-income patients with the drug that extended their lives from 6 mouths to 5 years. 
The relevant decisions reveal that F2W, in certain circumstances, allows the patentee to enjoy his 
or her patent rights through mere export. This feature of F2W suggests that does not violate the 
principle of non-discrimination, and therefore makes F2W TRIPS compliable. Having F2W in line 
with international patent law instruments, the Indian policymaker can be more confident making 
use of CL mechanism. A frequent use of CL contribute to a favorable climate for promoting A2M. 
F2W has a flexible meaning that involves categories of human rights such as “availability” and 
“accessibility”. This allows F2W to be very efficient in promoting A2M because the ground 
“speaks” human right language within the patent law discourse. Despite conceptual challenges that 
F2W faces. It can be argued that whereas shifting mode of regulation to policymaking and 
legislation is preferable, F2W provides a successful way of promoting A2M by limiting patents in 
judicial forum. In order to promote A2M, it is reasonable for other national judicial authorities to 
adopt the Indian approach towards interpretation of F2W, until a sustainable policy and legislation 
become available. 
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